Discussion about this post

User's avatar
CanadianRealist's avatar

Nobody likes a hater, but this is going nowhere. The acoustic vulnerability they hint at only applies to a small subset of the most crappy, vulnerable UAVs - the hardware equivalent of targeting an old, obsolete version of Windows with a known security flaw. Moreover, even with an ideal target, it doesn't work at any practical distance. Case in point: the "prototype" in their photo is already quite large and is "disabling" a toy drone from less than a half meter away. You can hear them managing expectations already because they know this doesn't scale. The idea you could "push back" a drone with this, in anything but the most contrived scenario and meaningless way, is ridiculous.

Technically illiterate optimists might want to wave these problems away, but the problem here isn't "you can't make the solution cheap enough, or small enough" - it's "the physics of acoustic propagation mean this approach is doomed".

Also, can someone explain what the following excerpt means?

> "An interesting thing we do is selectively spoof the drone’s cameras. Meaning the drone stays where it is, but the camera is spoofed, which helps with ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) purposes, like surveillance."

What is meant by spoof, and how does spoofing (or disrupting?) video help with surveillance? Oddly written article.

1 more comment...

No posts

Ready for more?